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Software Fault Tree Analysis (SFTA) is a technique used to analyze software for faults 
that could lead to hazardous (;onditions in systems whkh contain software components. 
Previous thesi.~ works have developed three Ada-based, semi-automated software analysis 
tools, the Automated Code Translation Tool (ACIT) an Ada statement template generator, 
the Faul t Tree Editor (fTE) a graph.ical fault tree editor, and the hult Isolator (FI) an 
automated sofr\vare faul t tree isol ator. These previous works did not apply their tools on a 
real system. Therefore, the question addressed by this thesis is "Do these tools acmall y 
work on a real-world software control system'I" 
This thesis developed and implemented a sample Software System Analysis 
Methodology (SSAM) using these semi ·automated software tools. The research applied 
this methodology to a real-world distributed control system written in Ada. Thc Missile 
Engagement Simulation Arcna's (MESA) control software was dcveloped by the Naval Air 
Warfare Center, Weapons Division, China Lake, CA. 
The SSAM was used to show that the analysis of the Sphere-HWCI contIol module's 
74,000 lines of code could be thoroughly analyzed in less than 100 man-hours . This 
practical, 740 lines-of-code per hour rate was a direct result of the incorporation of the 
semi-automated tools into the process. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Computers are part of everyday lifc_ From the complex systems found in the Space 
Shuttle to the Fisher Price Alphabet computer two-year-old children play with in the home. 
This wide spectrum of computer usage is evidence that we have become a computer-
technology-dependent society. As this dependency has imTcased, more and more safetj 
critical systems have becollle automate<i. This automation, reiying heavily upon software 
control systems, increases productivity and efficiency but also greatly increases the 
possibility of ca tastrophic consequences in the event of system failures. Safety critical 
systems are those that manage processes that can diret:tly impact human lives and/or 
expensive equipment and property. System failures directly rela te into serious and usually 
unacceptable human and property losses, The degree of these losses depend greatly on the 
type of system involved. To reduce these losses, it is imperative that control systems 
confo rm to a standardized evaluation to ensure its reliability. depl;":ndability and safety. The 
development of useful ml;":tllods to detect, isolate and eliminate thl;": causes of these high risk 
failures is crucial in demonstrating the reliability and dependability of current and flUure 
safety critical software control systems. 
Hardware failures and defects are well underswod and documented. 1luough the 
history of the industrial age, the science of hardware failure analysis and ilS concepts, 
causes and effects have been exhaustively evaluated and quantified. The same cannot be 
said about the conccpts, causes and effe!:ts of software induced failures. The need for 
standardized software safety analysis principles and techniques is undeniable. This thesis 
examines the requirement for and development of a practical and effective software safety 
analysis methodology for safety-c6tical software systems. 
A. SOFTWARE SAFETY 
Safety has been defined as "freedom from those !:onditions that can cause death . 
injury, occupational illness, or damage to or loss of equipment or property Wef. 1]." A 
definition for software safety can then be given as. "freedom from software-caused death. 
injury , damage to or loss of equipment or propeny lRef. 2]." Mishap, hazard. accident and 
risk are related concepts to safety that must be defined to understand the requirement for 
software safety. A mishap is an unplanned event or series of events that result in death, 
injury, occupational illness, damage tu or loss of equipment or property. or environmental 
harm. Hazard and accident are usually used intcrchangeably. A hazard refers to thc state or 
states of a system that when combined with certain cnvironmental conditions could lead to 
a mishap, where accident is defined as an unwanted and unexpected releasc uf energy. Risk 
is defined as a function of the probability of a hazardous state occurring, the probability of 
the hazard leading to a mishap, and the perceived severity of the worst potential mishap that 
could result from the hazard [Ref. 1]. With these stated definitions, it is no surprise that 
software safety has become a major concern in today's safety critical conrrol systems. 
Project managers cannot afford to take thc risk of minimizing the importance of software 
safety in these critical systems. Though acceptable levels of softv.are safety have been 
achievcd, at current technology levels. no system can be guaranteed free from defects. With 
this inevitable human-induced limitation, software safety then involves ensuring that the 
system will execute within a given context without resulting in unacceptable risk 
Methodologies have becn developed to reducc risk to an acceptable level while increasing 
system safety. This is achieved by identifying potential hazards early in the developmcnt 
process and then establishing requircments and design features to eliminate or control these 
hazards [Ref. J] 
When discussing safety, the concept of reliability emerges. Though related, these two 
concepts are not the same. Reliability is defllled as the probability that a system performs 
its assigned function under specified environmental conditions for a given period of time. 
Extended to software, the definition becomes the probability that a software system fulfils 
its assigned task in a given environment for a predefined number of input cases. assuming 
the input cases are free of errors lRcf. 3j. Therefore, it can be said that reliability 
requirements are concerned with making a system fai lure-free, where safety requirements 
are concerned with making it mishap-free [Ref. IJ. 
B. SOFTWARE DEFECTS 
The American Heritage Dictionary defines ddect a~ "an imperfection, failing or fault." 
As related to software, a standard defini tion of suftware defects can then be those faults, 
errors or failures contained in a software system LRef. 4J. Understanding the nature and 
interrelationships of tllese defeel~ is essential when conducting any type of software safety 
anaJysis. 
1. Faults 
Faul ts are those defects in a component or design which ultimately arc responsible for 
a failure. Some causes include design errors, electromagnetic interference, unanticipated 
inputs and system misuse [Rd. 5J. Faults exhibit different classifiable properties such as 
duration, nature and extent. The duration of a fault can be transient, intermi ttent or 
permanent. The nature of a fault is determined by its behavior in the system. It can either 
be logical, produciug logical value.~, or indeterminate. having no logical equivalent. The 
extent of faul ts determines the level of the fau h, either local or glohal. Faults originate in 
the system 's environment or from the interaction between the system and a user (process). 
Faults USUally have one of several effects [Ref. 4]: 
Disappear with no perceptiblt:: effect 
Remain in place with no perceptible effect 
Lead to a sequence of additional faults that result in a failure in the system's 
operation (propagation to failure) 
u ad to a sequence of additional faults with no perceptible effect on the system 
(undetec ted propagation) 
Lead to a sequence of additional faults that have a perceptible effect on the system 
but do not result in a failure of the system's operation (detected propagation 
without failure) 
2. Errors 
The term error is sometimes intcrchangt:<j with fault. however. there is a distinct 
difference. III the context of system states, an error is considered to be part of an erroneous 
state that constimtes a difference from a valid state. When a system is in an invalid state, 
an external state analysis of the system can determine the states that would need to be 
changed to make the internal state of the system valid. This internal state can be valid 
within itself but incompatible with its surrounding environment. This can occur when a 
design failure is introduCf{j in a component or through the interaction of a component in a 
valid state with one in an invalid state. An undesirable effect is the propagation of errors 
through the system changi.ng valid componenL~ to erroneous ones. This propeny tends to 
portray etTors in a transitive nature, linking the presence of faults with the failure of the 
system [Ref. 6]. 
3. Failures 
Every system is designed according to some specification. This specification defines 
the required operations and function.~ that the system is to perform. When the behavior of 
the sy.~tem fIrst deviates from this required specification, a failure has occurred [Ref. 6] 
This definition of fai lure assumes the given specification is free from "errors" which (:Quid 
eventually lead to a failure. This assumption is necessary to he able to derive a coherent, 
functional definition of a failure. The specifIcation does not, however, provide any insight 
to what behavior can be expected in the event of failures. This can be a problem when trying 
to design software that detects and copes \lfith fai lures. Classifying failure behavior uses a 
modeling method that qualifies the disruptive nature of the failures. This is useful when not 
all failures are of equal consequl:nee. These classifications of failures are as follows: 
Fail-Safe· Procedures that attempt to limit the amount of damage caused by a 
failure. No attempt is madc to satisfy the functional specifications except where 
safety is concerned 
Fail-Operational - Provides for fuU system functionality in the presence and 
migration of faults. 
Fail Soft Provides continued system operation but at a degraded performance or 
reduced functionality levd until the fault is removed or the run-time conditions 
change [Ref. \] , 
Using these classes of failures, it is possible to augment existing reliability tcchniljues 
that attempt to eliminate all failures with tCChmqm::s thal concena-ale on the high-cost 
failures. This effort can then ensure that these particular failures do nOL occur or at least 
their probability is minimized. Figure I summarizes the interrelationship between faults, 
errors and failures 
Figure I : Software Defect Relationships 
4. Software Defect Examples 
It is a well-known fact that software by itself cannot directly injury, maim or cause 
destruction. However. it is the interaction of this software with hardware that can produce 
catastrophic events [Ref. IJ. Computers are increasingly us(".d to monitor and control safety 
critical syslems. Real-time software controls aircraft, shuts down nuclear power reactors in 
emergencies, keeps telephone networks running, and monitors hospital patients. Tne use of 
computers ill such systems offers considerable benefits, but also poses serious risks to life 
and the environment. Tne following list of defective software-induced accidents and 
hazards is presented to expose some of these risks and to demonstrate the critical 
justifica tion for complete and comprehensive softv,:are safety analysis methodologies. 
Therac-25 Radiation Therapy Machine. A man was exposed to fatal radiation level 
treatments dill;:: to a software modification of the control software, resuJting in one 
human death alld the manufacturer going out of husiness fRet 71 
A French meteorological satellite computer was supposed to issue a read 
inSUllction to some high-altitude weather baUoons but instead ordered an 
"emergency self-destruct," resulting in 72 of 141 weather balloons destroyed [Ref. 
1] . 
An air-to-air missile loaded on the wing of an F/A- !8 jet fighter fai led to separate 
[rom the launcher because a computer program signaled the missile retaining 
mechanism to close before the rocket had buill up sufficient thrUSt to clear the 
rrrissile from the wing. The aircraft went violently out of control resulting in loss 
of the aircraft [Ref. 1]. 
C. SOFTWARE ANAL YSIS TECHNIQUES AND TOOLS 
Software safety analysis and verification is required hy contractors of safety critical 
systems. At least three Department of Defense standards include related tasks; one general 
safety standard ['MIL-STD-8R2C 1993] includes tasks for software hazard analysiS and 
verification of software safety; an Air Force standard for missile weapon systems lMlL-
STD·1574A 1979] requires a complete and integrated software safety analysis; and the U.S 
Navy has a standard for nuclear weapons systems [MIL-STD-SNS 1986] that requires 
software nuclear safety analysis [Ref. 11. Currently, a major restructuring effort of all 
military standards is underv:ay. The outcome of this is unsure. However. it is almost certain 
that the number of military standards will decrease, consolidating numerous cWTent safety 
standards. 
Various software safety analysis techniques have been developed to aid in this required 
verification. A few of these teChniques have been tested and used extensively, while others 
aTe still being developed. From these techniques have come standardized methods and 
procedures to achieve the required reSUlts. This procedural characteristic has led 10 the 
automation of some of these techniques. 
The explosion of safety-critical software systems has put an enonnous burden upon 
software engineers and analysts to produce "failure free" systems. This requirement alone 
increases the complexity and work load required to produce such systems. Manual 
methods, even with large software teams, can no longer provide Ih~ requir«l effort subject 
to ever decreasing time and budget constraints. Today's software engineers and analysts 
must use automated wob to help in the proces$. Early automared tools were very splXific 
in their use and wen: met with skepticism due to their unreliablt: nature and poorly proven 
track records. As more time. effort and resources were dedicated to the development of 
these tools. the concept of Computer Aided Software Engineering (CASE) tools was born. 
Continuing efforts at prestigious software engineering institutions like the Software 
Engineering Institute (SEI) at Carnegie Mellon University have made great snides in 
developing standard methods for software safety analysis. Automation of the entire 
software development life cyde from requirements development through code generation 
and testing is an ongoing project. It is imperative to develop correct requirement and design 
specifications in order to eliminate the incorporation of faults and errors in to the given 
software system. This is especially important in safety-critical software modules where any 
defect could cause loss of life and/or material. 'rne development of correctly-implemented 
automated requirement and design generation method$ will allow the development of 
virtually fault free systems. However, this is far from being a reality. Current technology 
in dealing with natural language requirements precludes the development of a correct 
automated tool. Automated tools have been proven in the code and testing generation 
cycles and Me us('".d extensively today. The following manual and automated analySiS 
techniques are introduced as background for use later in developing a useful analysis 
methodology [Ref. 81 
L Hazard Identification and Analysis 
Hazard analysis involves identifying and assessing the criticality level of hazards and 
risks involved in the syst~m design. Harard analysis is an ongoing evolution throughout the 
development life cycle of the sy~tem. The different stages of hazard analysis consist of 
preliminary (PHA) . subsystem (SSHA) , system (SHA) and operating/support (OSHA). 
These analysis are crucial in detecting and identifying safety critical hazards. Several 
techniques havc been developed to perform these analyses such as Failure Modes and 
Effects AnalysiS (FMEA). Faull Tree Analysis (FTA), Petri Net Modelling. Statecharts, 
Event Tree Analysis (ETA), design reviews/walk-throughs, cht:.eklists and other hazard! 
operability analysis methods. Some of these methods are described below_ 
Fault Tree Analysis 
This thesis concentrates on the Software Fault Tree Analysis (SFTA) 
methodology extensively_ Chapter II is dedicated to r'J'A and SFTA; their purpose, 
concepts and structure. In this section, numerous automated tools developed at the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPGS) under the direction of Doctor Timothy 1. Shimeail will be 
introduced. These tools will be the corc of thc proposed software safcty analysis 
methodology presented larer 
ACTT 
The Automated Code Translation Tool was developed by Captain Robert 
Ordonio, USA, and extended by LCDR William Reid, USN. using rcsources at the Naval 
Postgraduate School. AC1T translatcs Ada statemcnts into template Strllctures to be used 
in SFTA. The tool consists of four component>:_ First, a lexical analyzer, which detcmunes 
if the input consists of valid tokens. Next is a parser generator, which checks that the input 
uses valid Ada constructs. Next is a template generator, which transfonns valid statements 
into templates representing possible events associated with thc statement in a formal 
suitable for SIT A. The last component is a file generator that creates a file that meets the 
specifications of a fault tree editor (FTE) file type [Ref. 9). ACITtakcs an Ada source code 
file as input and processes cach Ada statement into its associated fault tree template, 
connecting them accordingly. The output is WTitten as an FfE specified file for further 
analysis. 
FTE 
In general, fault tree editors are used to graphically display and modify fault 
trees. These editors allow software analysts to interactively manipulatc the graphic 
representation of a fault tree by using an automated graphlc editor. This usage significantly 
reduces the time required to draw and n:draw the trees during analysis. 
rill: Faull Tree Edilor (FTE) used ill th is thesis was written by Charles P 
Lombardo, Computer Systems Programmer for the Computer Science Dcpanment at 
NPGS. The code was v.rnttl:n in the "C" progranmling language using XView, an OPEN 
LOO K tool ki t, for the Xl I Windowing System. This editor loads a user,defincd fau lt tree 
file and graphically displays it using standard fault tree sym bology. The input fi le must 
conform to the specifications oj" PTE. The output from ACIT meets this specification and 
allows PTE to graphkally present its results. The PTE display can then he modified, printed 
and/or saved as a new file rRef. 9] . 
FI 
When dealing with software fault trees, tremendously large numbers of nodes 
can he generated from rdatively sma!! source code programs. To aid the analyst in 
managing these enormous tree sizes, a fault isolawr tool, Fault Isolalor (Fl), was designed 
and built. FI was written by Lieutenant Commander Russ Mason, USN, and incorporated 
an efficient graphical user interlace using the Transportable Application Environment tool 
(TAE) . R processes existing PrE compatible files a llowiog the analyst to '·prune" the 
original tree. This pruning process is accomplished by searching for the associated tree 
node that corresponds to a source code line of interest. R searches the tree ami rerums 
resul ts in three categories related to the source code lille num ber. exact match. contains 
match and closest match. This allows the analyst to determine which node/sub-tree is of 
interest and which can be pruned away. FI lets the analyst save the new tree which can then 
be displayed in PTE. This pruning process decreases the analysts work load by e liminating 
tedious manual tree searches (Ref. 10]. 
b. Failure Modl'S and EfTel"ls Analysis 
FMEA is an inductive technique that attempts to anticipate potentia] fail ures so 
that the source of those failures can be eliminated. FMEA consists of constructing a L1ble 
based Oil the components of the system and the possible fa ilure modes of each component. 
Though the exact impiementmion of the table can vary. the normal table consists of the 
following columns, component, failure mode, effect of failure, cause of failme, occurrence, 
severity, probability of detection, risk priority number and corrective action. A list of 
possible failure modes is generated for each component and insencd into the table. The 
remaining columns for each failure mode are then filled in using validated estimates and 
best guess judgements. This is strictly a manual analysis of the system that attempts to 
anticipate potential failures [Ref. 8]. 
c. Petri Nets 
Petri Nets arc a simple, elegant model for concurrent program analysis. The Pctri 
Net model is a 5-luple structured as (P,T J,a).,!). P is a finite set of places drawn as cirdes 
representing conditions. T is a finite set of transitions drawn as bars representing event~.1 
and a arc sets of input and output functions which map transitions to places and places to 
transitions, respectively. M is the set of initial markings (states) for the modelt:d net. 
Places may contain zero or more tokens drawn as black circles. A marking (or 
State) of the Petri Nets is the distrihution of tokens at a moment in time. Tokens in Petri 
Nets model dynamic behavior of systems. Markings change during execution of the Petri 
Nets as the tokens "travel" tJu'ough the net as in modelling the flow of infonnation. The 
execution of the Petri Nets is controlled by the number and distribution of the tokens. A 
transition is enabled if each of its input places contains at least as many tokens as there 
exists arcs from that place to the transition. When a rransition is enabled it may flre. When 
a transition fires, all enabling tokens are removed from its input places, and a token is 
deposited in each of its output places. 
Safety properties of Petri Nets can be analyzed without the need to necessari ly 
generate the entire reaehability graph. The idea is to work backwards from high-risk states 
to determine if these hazardous states are reaehabk. similar to Ff A. This backward method 
uses the inverse Petri net (reversed input and output functions), and is practical only when 
a small number of unsafe statt:s is considered. The idea is to work backwards from unsafe 
states to aU eritit:al states (i.e. states having at lea.~t two successors). When a critical state 
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is rcao:.:hc<L interlocks can be used to force the system to take those paths that do not lead to 
unsafe states [Ref. I l l . 
d. Stalecharts Analysis 
In Statecharts. a normal state rransition diagram is enham;ed with hierarchical 
and compositional features_ States can then be clustered imo super-states with the 
possibility of "zooming in" and "zooming out" of states. III an AND decompusition. states 
are split into concurrent subcomponents that communicate via broadcasting_ An OR 
decomposition decomposes a stale into sub-states such that cuntrol resides in exactly one 
sub-statc. When coupled with a standard graphics package, statechans enable viewing the 
description at different levels of detail. Statecharts can be used dther as a stand-aLone 
behavioral description or as part of a more general design methodology that dcals with the 
system' s other aspt"cts, such as functional decomposition and data-flow specification [Ref. 
12]. 
Others 
Nuclea r Safety Cross Check Analysis (NSCCA). This ml;.':thooology was 
devdoped to satisfy the USAF requiremcnt~ for nuclcar systems. This process has two 
main components one technical and one procedural. Thc technical evaluates the software 
by mUltipLe analyses and test procedures to ensure that it satisfies the systems nuclear safety 
requirements. The procedural implements security and control ml;.':asures to protect against 
sabotage, collusion, compromisc, or alteration of critical software components. tooJ.~, and 
NSCCA results. The goal of the NSCCA method is to attcmpt to show, with a high dcgree 
of confidence, that the software will nO! contribute 10 a nuclear Olishap LRef. 1]. 
Software Common Mode Analysis (SCMA). This technique is dcrived from its 
hardwarc predCl.:essor. In hardware common mode analysis, redundant, independent 
hardware components are used to provide fault tolerance. Research has shown that there is 
a potential for a single hardware failure to affect more than oTle redundant (;omponent 
through a softwttre path [Ref. 13J. Software common mode analysis uses structured walk-
1) 
throughs to examine the potential for a single failure to propagate acIOSS hardware 
boundaries via a software path lRcf. I]. 
Sneak Software Analysis. Another technique derived from its hardware 
counterpart. Here, the software is translated into circuit diagrams and analyzed to detect 
areas of unreachable code or unrderenced variables. This technique does not provide any 
great insight to software safety rather it provides more of a software reliability check and a 
poor one at that [Ref. 1]. 
D. THESIS PROJECT APPLICATION 
I. MESA O,'erview 
The Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division (NAWCWPNS), China Lake, 
California is developing a Missile Engagement Simulation Arena (MESA) in support of 
continued real-time weapons systems testing. MESA (Figure 2) is a military construction 
proje\:t that replaces its predecessor, the Encounter Simulation Laboratory (ESL) located in 
Corona, California, 
Figure 2: Missile Engagement Simulation Arena (MESA) 
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MESA is an indoor research, development, test and evaluation facility with the 
capabili ty to simulate the engagement of various missile fuzes with airborne targets. It 
provides an arena for the study and analysis of the electromagnetic interactions of the 
missile fuze sensors with targets during simulated engagements [Ref. 14J. 
2. MESA System Overview 
The MESA system structure is comprised of different hardware configuration items 
(HWCI) and computer software configuration items (CSCI) (Figure 3). 
Figure 3: MESA System Structure 
The main J-lWCl's consist of a Sensor Transport System (STS), two Overhead Target 
Suppon Systems (01'SS) and twO calibration Sphere Systems. Each HWC! system is 
controlled by a remote computer with associated control software . The CSCI's consist of a 
Control module, Fault Diagnustic mooule, Engagement Generation module, Data 
Acquisition mooule and a Quality Assurance module. The Control CSC! acts as the host 
coordinator for the MESA system. Each remote computer is capable of running in an open-
loop and closed-loop mode, depending upon the current system state. The Control CSCI 
maintains communication with all the remote computers, sending and receiving data as 





(Not to scale) 
Figure 4: Calibration Sphere Hardware Diagram 
E. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Due to availability of MESA software, this thesis will only analyze the sphere control 
system module. MESA has two calibration spheres that are suspended overhead the arena 
Each sphere has two control lines and two encoder lines. The control lines position the 
spheres in a vertical plane perpendicular to the data-collection direction. Movement up 
range and down range is not under software control and requires the hoists to be moved 
manually. The encoder lines are used to oblain strt:tch-independent measurements of the 
control lines' length. Each sphere has a sphere computer that is par! of the distributed 
control system. Each sphere computer controls its as.~ociated control and encodt:r lines. 
Figure 4 depicts the physicallayoUl of one of die calibration sphere systems. The sphere is 
suspended by control and encoder lines connected to individual stepper motors located 
within the structure of the arena. The stepper motors are controlled hy the remOle sphert: 
computer which operates in both an open loop mode for spht:re speed control and a elosed 
loop mode for sphere position control. The operator moves the sphere into its required 
position through the use of tllt: control module interface [Rd. 15]. 
This thesis addresses the questions, can larger .'\Cale software control SysteillS be 
efficiently and dfectively analyzed using new and existing automated and semi-automatt---d 
.wftwan: safety analysis methodologies? Specifically, can lhe automated tools ACTT, FTE 
and FI be used in combination with the standard software fault tree analysis technique to 
provide accurate and meaningful software safcty analysis data on a real world, currenlly 
developing project? These questions will be answered by analyzing the MESA calibration 
sphere subsystem using the automated tools aJl(i methodologies developed at till: Naval 
Postgraduate School. 
F. SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS 
1. II. }<'ault Tree Analysis Pnlecss 
This chapter outlines the fundamentals of fault tree analysis and it~ extension into the 
sofn.vare arena with software fault tree analysiS 
2. ill, Software System Analysis Methodulugy 
This chapter outlines a sample software safety analysis methodology consistlllg of a 
combination of standard manual techniques and locally developed automated techniques. 
3, IV. Methodology Implementatiun Results 
This chapter describes the implementation and presents the results of the sample 
software safety analysis methodology on the MESA Sphere-HWCl control software. 
4. V. Conclusions 
1l1is chapter presents author derived conclusions, recommendations and dewed future 
work areas of research. 
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lI. FAIJLT TREE A'iALYSIS 
Fault tree analysis was developed at Bell Telephone Laboratories in 1962 by H.R. 
W atson . It was initia!1y designed to be used for safl:ty and reliability stwiies of the 
Minuteman missile system. Engineers at Boeing funher developed and refined the 
procedures and became the method ' s foremost proponents as a method for performing 
safety analysis of complex electromechanical systems [Rd. 2]. A fault tree consists of fault 
events , branches and cree gates. Events aTC failure situations resulting from the logical 
interaction of primary failures or those failures of interest. Branches connect two events or 
a tree gate and an event. Gates arc boolean logic symbols that relate the input to its output. 
A system is represented by a series of these components making a fault tree 
Fault tree analysis starts with defining a particular undesirable event and then provides 
an approach for analyzing l.he causes of this evcnt. It is important to choose this event 
carefully. If it is too general, the fault tree be.comes large and unmanageable, likewise, if 
the event is too specific then the analysis may nO! provide a sufficiently braan enough view 
of the system. Fault tree analysis can be extremely time consuming and expensive. 
Therefore: some method of choosing a set of desired hazardous events must be 
imple~lented. This can be accomplishe:d through the pre:liminary hazards analysis 
previousl y discussed. Each top-level hazard event is then analyzed. 
Once the hazard has been chosen, it is used as the top event of a fault tree: diagram. The 
syste:m is them analyzed to determine all the likely ways in which that undesir{".(j hazard 
could occur. The faul l. tree is a graphicai representation of the various combinations of 
hazards thaI k ad to the undesirt;(i event. The faults may be caused by component failures, 
human fa ilures or any other event that could lead to the undesired hazard, such as a random 
environment event. It should be noted that a fault tree is not a modd of the system or even 
a modd of the ways in which the system could fail. Rather it is a depiction of the logical 
interrelationships of basic events that may l~a.d to a particular undesired event fRef. 81. 
The two most common gates used in fault tree analysis are the AND gate and the OR 
gate. If one or more events arc required to produce the output event then an AND gate 
connector is used. The AND gate connect.'> two or more hazards. An output occurs if all of 
the input hazards occur (Figure 5). 
Figure 5: AND Gate 
If one or more events can produee the output event then an OR gate connector is used. 
An output hazard occurs from an OR gate if any of the input hazards occur (Figure 6). Other 
gates that are occasionally used in FTA are the exclusive OR, priority and the inhibit. These 
will not be covered here 
Figure 6: OR Gale 
This analysis proc~ss contin ues until all hazards in the tlee are ei ther defined or cannot 
be decomposed further. The culmination of a fault tree analysis is a depiction of the 
required hazard sequence that must happen for the top hazardous event to ocel.lr.lf no such 
path exists, then it is shown that the top event cannot occur lRef. 9). 
A. SOFTWARE FAULT TREE ANALYSIS 
Software fau lt tn:e analysis (SFT A) was developed in 1983 through three nearly· 
simultaneously independent efforl~ by MclJuee rRef. 161, Leveson and Harvey [Ref. 171 
and Taylor (Ref. 181. Their research applied proven FrA techniques to the analysis of 
software . The proce~s paralleled standard ITA principles, s tarting witll a top event and 
working backwards through the tree, generating a path that showed the necessary hardware 
as well as software events that had to occur. 
SFTA, like FI'A, starts with a defined top event. 111i s event is described through a 
hazard analysis and is usually a safety critical event. TIle process assumes that the system 
has faikd according w the defined event and works backwards to detennine the SCI of 
possible paths that allow the event to occur. TIlis path is made up of funher decomposed 
events connected by gates similar to those in FTA . Events are continually expanded until 
either they cannot be developed funher due to lack of information or insuffic ient 
consequences or they no longer require analysis. Common soft\\' are fau lt trec symbols and 
their associated meanings can be fou nd in Appendix A. Once the trce has been fully 
expanded and anaJyzed, it can be shown that the program either allows or disallows the top 
evcnt state to be reachcd. This information is then used to correct the program, if required , 
eliminating the undesired cvent's occurrence. Each evcnt in the ~et of undesirable events is 
then analyzed in a similar fashion. Jt has been shown that for large systems, the use of 
partial Sl-IA can be effective in finding faults and in identifying critical modules that may 
need further analysis [Ref. 1]. 
An interesting note arises beT\liCen the manner in which SFTA handles the 
quantification of event probabili ties. Unlike hardware fau lt trees where eat.:h hazard/<::vent 
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can be assigned a given probability of failure due to centuries of historical data, software 
railures are in and or themselves logical, not lending themselves to a level of probability, 
TIle software either works or it does not. This distinction between probabilistic hardware 
fault crees and logical software fault crees is impOitant in understanding the (;omplexity 
involved in trying to conduct a complete software analysis. 
In summary, SFTA can be used to determine software safety requirements, detect 
logic errors and identify multiple failure sequences involving different parts of the system 
that lead to har.ardous events. 
III. SOFTWARE SYSTEM ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY 
Most analysis methodologies incorporate different combinations of software 
analysis techniques dep~nding upon the application, available 1001s and experience of the 
analyst. Combining techniques and knowing when and which ones to use is an important 
patt of the over aU system safety analysis process. eha discusses a safety oriented design 
method whose goal is to minimize the amount of safety-critical code and to produce a 
design whose safety can be certified [Ref. 19J. His work asserts that hal..ard analysis of 
designs allows the safety analyst to modify the sofTWare design to prevent the oc(;urrencc 
of hazardous states during operation. It is important that a practical, standardized 
methodology be implemented Wh!;.':ll performing software safety analysis. This chapter 
outlines a methodology consisting of a combination of .~tandard manual techniques and 
automated techniqucs that havc becn developed at the Naval Postgraduate Schuol. This 
methodology will be partially implemented and demonstrated in the ncxt chapter. 
A. STEP I: CONCEPT EXPLORATION AND SYSTEM RESEARCH 
The analyst must become intimately familiar with the systcm and its subsystems 
before any realistic analysis can be staned. lnterviews and discussions with design team 
personnel, project site visits, relaled system research and current system documentation 
reading are all possible sources of information. This research must be thorough and 
complete. Additionally, it must include any management proposed analysis constraints. 
These constraints shuuld be included in the software development plan and covcr analysis 
time lines, milestones and goals. fly accomplishing this step the analyst gains a 
fu ndamental understanding of the entire system design and its relevant interfaces. Though 
the purpose of this step is not to make the softwarc analyst into the system engineer. the 
time spent in this step will pay dividends throughout the entire analysis process 
n. STEP 2: HAZARD IDENTlFICATlON 
There does not seem to be anyone easy way to identify hazards within a given 
.~ystcm. Hindsight is always 20{20. After a mishap occurs, an investigation usually reveals 
a SCt of causes and the engineers learn for the next time lRef. 8] . However, in safety-critical 
systems, there may be no next lime. With no "systematic" process in which to look for 
hazards, the use of domain experts and thorough research is proposed as a "best" 
alternative. If the concept exploration step above is perfonned correctly, a decent 
foundation will be available to venture into this identification process. A group of "experts" 
should be designated and chartered to perform this process. An important pre-requisite 
must he that the group understands the differences between the new system and previous 
systems, if any, so that they can understand the new failure modes introduced by the new 
system. Xumerous group decision methods have been proposed. The Delphi Technique and 
"brainstorming" are offered here as a best combination usage. 
L Delphi Technique 
This method was created by the Rand corporation for the U.S. government and 
remained classified unti l the 1960's. The basic approach is to send out a questionnaire to 
all members of the group that enables them to express their opinions on the discussion 
topic. An appointed coordinator collects all the inputs, collates them and returns the 
sununarized information to the members in an anonymous format. This process continues 
until a consensus is reached on the topk (Ref. Xl. 
U sing this technique in hazards identification offers a wide range of advantages. 
With the dramatic increase of electronic mail. many more "experts" have become available 
for inclusion to software groups. The constraints of physical meetings would be eliminated 
and the process of collecting and distributing the results relatively painless. Group 
members could easily digest the required system research information and make sound 
judgementS in a matter of days vice weeb. 
2. Brainstorming 
This "technique" may seem more like common sense then a defined process. But in 
cases where resources are limited and/or the system is big enough to prevent obtaining an 
exh austive hazards list, brainstorming can actually provide a plethora of hazards that 
otherwise: would not have been identified. No meetings are required. Experts arc solicittXl 
to list all possible hazards that they envision for the system. These lists an: gathered by the 
analyst and processed in to a formal systems hazards list. 
Through the combined use of the Delphi TeChnique and brainstorming in this step. 
the analyst is provided with an excellent set of potential high level system hazards to start 
the analysis process 
3. Program Management Input 
Managemt:nt plays a vital role in hazards identification. II must allow the Ddphi 
group or the solidted ex-pens time to produce the identified hazards, hut not so much timc 
that dfons are wasted. Some form of guidelines needs to be established. This could be in 
the form of a set of hazard analysis criteria or as simple as a time line. With the support of 
management and the use of good research and brainstorming techniques, a complete and 
useful set of hazards ean be identified and readied for analysis. 
C. STEP 3: PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS 
This step actually begins the analysis section of the process, but as its name implies, 
it is the precursor to the fonnal hazards analysis :md provides a framework from which the 
analyst can conduct a detailed analysis. The PHA must be executed using the most current 
resources available. Due to its currently tedious and manual executioIl, any delay or re-
design causes frustration and lost work man hours. 
A thorough, methodical analysis of each available resource must he accomplished. 
By starting with the software development plan (SDP) and the software requirements 
spedfication (SRS), the analyst ean isolate the areas that relate directly to the list of 
identified hazards. This will drastically reduce the task at hand. TIlis iIlitial cutting down of 
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rcquirt:mcnts helps reduce the scale and complexity of the analysis. Depending upon the 
system being analyzed, other documents may need to be inspected. This list of documents 
should include at a minimum, those documents usoo in Step I during the Concept 
Exploration and System Research phase. 
Next, a table is constructed containing each of the identified requirements, its 
associated possible hazard. possible result if the hazard occurs and its severity level in 
terms of loss of life and property. An example is provided in Table I. The idea here is to 
take the developed list of hazards from Step 2 and map them to their defining requirements 
found in the system documentation. A thorough mapping is important, however, an 
exhaustive one generates an unmanageable table. It is best that an ongoing dialogue 
between the analysts and the software developers be concurrent with the PHA to help 
reduce. combine and/or eliminate unnecessary mappings. By accomplislling this step the 
analyst narrows the scope of the analysis and bt:gins to focus on the safety critical areas of 
the system. Additionally, the analyst gains arough quantified understanding of the analysis 
problem and identifies the specific high severity component hazards of interest which will 




SDP Requirement Possible Hazard Possible Result 
Control CSC] moves Erroneous control sig- HardwareJPersonnel 
and positions the simu- nats;ue generated and damage/injury 
lation h1lrdware sent to the system 
hardware 
lable 1. Example PllA of MESA Sonwa~ Development Plan 
D. STEP 4: HAZARD ANALYSIS 
Severity 
High 
This step begins with the analyst determining which software modules are the most 
safety critical using the results of the PHA. This refined level of hazard identification at this 
step allows the analyst to perform a combination inductive and deductive techniglle. This 
combined process ftrst uses Failure Modes and Eff('-C iS Analysis (FMEA) as an inductive 
technique to determine wh<ll hazardous states are possible. Once these states are defined, a 
specific hazard fault tree is developed. Then the deductive technique of SFTA is applied to 
determine how the specific hazard can occur. Here the proposed methodology diverges 
fro m the high level software system context and .~tans to concentrate on specific software 
configuration items. 
1. Step 4.a: Failure Mode.~ Effect Analysis 
As described in Chapler I, the implementation of FMEA is accomplished by 
manually constructing a table. Table 2 shows an example, building upon Ihe PHA in Step 
3. Even by processing only identified safety-cri tical items, the table can become a rather 
large document. A directed effon 10 consolidate and combine similar items through group 
discussion will help keep this stcp manageable. 
CSC! 
signals 
Fai lure Mode 
Hos~lrelTlote 
computers 



















Table 2. Example ~MEA or MESA Control esC! 
Prob Risk Correctivc 
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By accomplishing this step the analyst more succinctly defines the safety-cri tical 
scope of the analysis and determines which areas need to be further analyzed. ·The output 
of the FMEA produces a set of top-level events that are then used as input for the next SICP, 
Specific Hazard Fault Tree Generation. 
2. Step 4.b: Specific Hazard Fault Tree Generation 
At this point the analyst has accumulated a list of independent safety-critical events. 
These events are used to generate separate fault trees that identify the logical pathways 
from those events to their associated source code. The analyst makes each top-level event 
a root node in its specific hazard fault trce. Thc node is then decomposed into its requin:d 
causes. This is continued umil the final event leaf nodcs succinctly define source codc 
modules or areas. FTE is extremely useful in this stcp. With its graphic interface and 
immediate feedback, FrE provides the analyst with the generated fault trec quickly and 
effectively. The leaf nodes from this step become the input for the ncxt step, SFrA. 
3. Step 4.c: Software Fault Tree Analysis 
In traditional methodologies, SFTA is carried out using manual mcthods. At most, 
a crude text and/or graphics editor would be used to assist the analyst in drawing and re' 
drawing the required fault trees with abSOlutely no computer-aided analysis. This paper's 
proposed methodology systematizes the standard SFT A technique by incorporating the use 
of locally-developed, automated, fault-tree tools. This automated fault-tree generation and 
manipUlation process dramatically reduces analysis time and substantially reduces human 
induced errors. At this point, developed code is required for the following steps to be 
cxecuted. 
a. Step4.c.l: ACTT 
The amllyst takes the set of top-level events generated in Step 4.a and 
detennines which of those event" have had their Ada code developed. Those not yet coded 
should he noted and a list kept for other processing, either when the eode becomes available 
or using a design-analysis teChnique. It is imponam that currently-uncoded critical modules 
not be passed over or forgotten. Source-code-line-number labels should be generated for 
all coded modules. Top-level evcnts should then be paired with their corresponding code 
lines. This mapping is necessary when using FI in the following step. 
26 
Each coder! module should then be run through ACTI. This process iS4Uick 
and generates a software fault tree in the FfE-specified format. The analyst silould be 
prepared for a large number of output files as each module is processed. ACIT generates 
a separate fault cree file for the main procedure/package body, each task body and each 
defined exception statement. Separate working areas for each module helps in keeping the 
output organized. This is important as ACT"T writes its output to identical fi le names that 
will over write any previously existing output frvm other processed modules. An example 
excerpt from an ACIT generated fIle is shown in Figure 7. For large numbers of modules, 
script or batch rIles can be written to execute this step in an even more efficient manner. 
After all necessary modules are processed, the omput can then he manipulated and 
analyzed usi.ng the combination of Fault Isolator and Fault Tree Editor as described in the 
next step. 
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Last statemen t causes Fault 
traftic.a 
4548085 I 0 1 
Figure 7: Example ACTT Output File 
It is interesting to note, that modules not fully corled can still be processed 
by Acrr. l llis "pre-processing" may }Jrove useful in some cases where a marc abstract 
fault tree could help to rletermine which detaikd corle structures would be less fault prone. 
b. Step 4.c.2: FTEIFI 
This step usesFI and Fl"E in combination to isolate and manipulate the fault 
tree generated in the Step 4.c. L The analyst should launch both applications and position 
their work-space interfaces so that both are visible. The idea here is to use ITE to display 
the fault tree. determining which sub-tree and/or nodes need to be isolated for further 
processing based upon the source-wde lines of imerest. 
FrE is used to display the ACIT generated fault tree. The same fault tree is 
then opened for processing using Fl. FI will display the total number of nodes and the rree 's 
depth (root node is level zero). If the rree is of small to medium size, these tree statistics 
can be verified by moving the FTE display around, counting the exposed nodes. The Search 
for Nodes option in Fl is then i>Clccted. Using the source-code-line-number created in Step 
4.c.l as input. FI returns three lists of matching nodes. Exact Match. Containing Match and 
Closest Match. From this, the analyst can detennine which node, nodes or sub-trees that 
need to be eliminated. Once the sub-fault tree is isolated, it can be displayed in FfE for 
funher isolation, to be printed or saved as a new fault tree file. Figure 8 shows FI's main 
menu and Figure 9 shows FTE's display of an example fault rree. 
'"", ' ,'. Y iFault l:wlator Tool - Main 
Choose an Option 
• Open a New File for Processing 
¢ Conduct a Search for Nodes 
¢ List Search Results 
¢ Isolate a Specific Node (Create New FTE File) 
¢ Manipulate Fault Descriptions 
I ExitPrograrn I 
Figure 8: Fault holator Tool Main Menu 
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Figure 9: Fault. Tree Editor Example Display 
The (;ombinell use of 111I:se two tools gives the analyst a powerful method to 
perform efficient and accurate manipulation and isolation of the fault tree. 111ese isolated 
sub-fault trees depict the safety-critical-software hazards and their possible paths of 
occurrence. With these graphical depictions the software analyst (;an then movc onto the 
next step of results analysis. 
4. Step 4.d: Results Analysis 
The final analysis of the preceding automated and semi-automated steps is now 
performed. This analysis is stilllintited to manual methods supponed by automated tools 
and takes on an iterative process format. As design and code decisions are made from the 
generated sub-fault trees, repeated manipulations and re-generations of those trees will be 
required using A and PTE. Each identified hazard should be processed through these steps. 
A bringing together of coupled modules is anticipated and will result in the need for the 
merging of various generated fault trees. The current functionality of FI and PTE does not 
allow this yet. Future implementation is being proposed. At this point the analysis 
methodology has reached a logical conclusion point. 
E. METHODOL.OGY SUMMARY 
This proposed software system analysis methodology has tried to establish a direct. 
efficient and effective examination process using a combination of standard manual 
techniques and newly constructed automated tools. The methodology steps and knowledge 
gained are summarized in Table 3 below. An analysis of a portion of the MESA control 
system will be conducted implementing this methodology in the next chapter. 
Step Process 
Concept Exploration and System Research 
Hazards Identification 
• Delphi Technique and Brainstorming 
Preliminary Hazard Analysis 
Hazards Analysis 
4.a. Failure Modes Effects Analysis 
4.b. Specific Hazard Fault Tree Generation 
4.c. Software Fault Tree analysis 
4.c.1. Automated Code Translation Tool 
4.c.2. Fault Tree Editor/Fault Isolator Tools 
4.d. Results Analysis 
Knowledge Gained 
Overallsystt:mdesign 
Potential high level 
system hazards 
Specific component 
hazards of interest 
How given possible 
hazardous stales can 
Table 3: Software System Analysis Methodology Summa ry 
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IV. METHODOLOGY IMPLEMENTATION RESULTS 
This chapter describes the implementation of the complete software safety analysis 
methodology. The MESA wnrro\ system was selected for analysis due to its Ada 
progranuning language usage. disnibUled safety-critical wntrol system structure and its 
apropos military application nature. Each melhorlology step outlines action taken and the 
corresponding results. This provides a concise discussion on the implementation and 
resulting usefulness of each step. 
A. CONCEPT EXPLORATION AND SYSTEM RESEARCH 
Initial system research was conducted through a combination of manual and 
eleclTonic means. E:<lensive use of the lnternet allowed system design documentation to be 
updated and accessed in minimal time. Additionally, constructive conversations with the 
MESA system engineer and software development learn were made easily through the use 
of electronic mail. These were important factor~ due to the over 300 miles between the 
MESA facility and the Naval Postgraduate SchooL A project site visit was conducted 10 
China Lake, CA to tour the facilities and meet the MESA projcct personnel. The 
discussions held were extremely useful in providing system familiarity , identifying 
relevant hazards and projecting sySlem implementation availability. 
Two primary documents were utilized to obtain the required system familiarity. 
The:;e were the Software Development Plan (SOP) [Ref. l4J and the Software 
Requirements Specification (SRS) [Ref. 15[. These documents were critical to the 
understanding of the system, its design and the project's development plan. A thorough 
discu~sion on these documents combined with the project personnel mectings allowed 
sufficient details of the system interfaces to be collected and identified for use in 
determining possible system hazards. 
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B. HAZARD IDENTIFICATION 
The hazard identification step was implemented through the use of brainstorming 
sessions. The Delphi Technique was not implemented due to the academic nature of this 
analysis. Numerous face-to-fac~ and e1~ctronic brainstorming sessions were held between 
different wmbinations of the author, the author's thesis advisor and various MESA project 
personnel. 'Ibis provided a small group of e;o;:perts to analyze the system and identify 
potential high-level , high-severity hazards. This led the group to entertain only those 
hazards dealing directly with loss of life and property/material damage. 
Eaeh HWCI was analyzed and lists of possible hazards generated. The analysis 
was then artificially focused on the Sphere HWCI since it was the only HWCI at the time 
of the analysis with fully-functional Ada control code. Six high-level possible hazards were 
identified as listc:d below. 
·Sphere Impacts Arena Structure 
·Sphere Impacts Object Other Than Arena 
·Spher~ Stops At Undesired Position 
·Sphere Encoder Lines Break 
·Sphere Control Lines Break 
·Inadvertent Sphere Line Movement 
C. PRELIMINARY HAZARD ANALYSIS 
The PHA step started with continued examination of the SOP and SRS. During this 
process, it was determined that four of the six high-level possible hazards wer~ actually 
predecessors for the other two. This narrowed down the list to two specific hazards of 
interest. A detailed mapping of each of these specific hazards of interest to its associated 
defining-requirements in the SDP and SRS was made. Table 4 depicts the hazards. their 
defining requirements and possible result if the hazard occurs. 
Though the results look somewhat simplified. this step proved to be labor intensive 
and time consuming. The SOP and SRS contained over 150 pages of requircment.~, 
requiring 45 hours of manual reading and analysis. The PHA narrowed thl: scope of the 
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anal ysis, focusing on the specific hazards of interest within the Sphne HWCl. The other 
system HWCls and CSCts were also ex-amine--O. As an e;o;ampk of a more involved PHA, 
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this analysis step, a review of the PHA was conducted by MESA project personnel during 
a scheduled site visit. This review proved extrcmely valuahle by identifying and 
prioritizing specific system hazards. 1l1is step demonstrated that the PHA greatly reduced 
the number of possihle hazards for each configuration item. narrowed the scope of the 
analysis to concentrate on the specific hazards of interest and enabled the analysis 
methodology to focus on the safety-critical areas of the Sphere HWCI. 
D. HAZARDS ANALYSL';; 
Thl: hazard analysis began by looking strictly at the Sphere HWCI specific hazards 
of interest. A FMEA was performed followed by the "meat of the analysis" using SFfA 
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1. FMEA 
The Sphere HWCI FMEA prodUl:ed the results depicted in Table 5. The individual 
FMEA items were derived from their safety-eritkal properties as related to the specific 
hazard of interest. This step provided a clear. concise listing of the spcdfic top-level events 
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'Bible S: Results of FMEA on MESA Sphere HWeI 









ficd and routine 
hardwareinspec-
tionsconducted 
The Specific Hazard Fault Tree Generation step was implemented using the hazards 
analysis results from the previous IWO steps. The two lop-level specific-hazard faults of the 
Sphere HWCI determined from the PHA were designated rOOI nodes for their respeclive 
fault trees. Through the U.'>C of FTE. the tree generation process began. Each root ha:.:ard 
was piece-wise decomposed into to its subsequent fault-causes. This process was 
accomplished through the interactive discussions between the author and the author's 
thesis advisor. As each hazard's fault-causes were determined, corresponding nodes were 
added to the fault tree. Each "Cause of Failure" result generated in the FMEA was used to 
help build the tree. These fault-causes ended up being interior nodes of the tree and 
logically linked the specific-hazard fOot node with the user-generated, source-code level 
leaf nodes. 
)4 
The flIst specific hazard fault ITee was generated for the specific hazard sphere 
impaclS arella (Figure 10). The top-level faul t was decomposed into two independent 
faul ts, 1) sphae CUlllrotline breaks OR 2) conrrolled motiun oj the sphere impacts the 
arena. These two faults are depicted at level one in Figure 10_ The control-line-brcaks faul t 
Figure 10: Sphere Impacts Arena Specific Hazard Fault. Tree 
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was not further analyzed since it dealt more with hardware failure issues than software. The 
controlled-motion fault was further decomposed. using the FMEA failure causes as shown 
in Figure 10. Eventually five refined leaf nodes were generated. These leaf nodes succinctly 
defined specific Sphere HWCI source-code modules 
This process was duplicated for the second specific hazard fault tree. Sphere 
impacts object other than arena (Figure II). This tree generation effort paralle led that of 
Figure 11: Sphere Impact~ Object Other Than Arena Specific Hazard I'ault Tree 
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the first hut includru the additional first-level independent fault of ohjecrmo(ion other than 
the sphere causes impact. From the system design, the only logical objects that could 
impact the sphere were the target, sensor transporter and the sensor. Each of these objects 
be<.:ame leve l-two nodes and further decomposition was perfomllw. 
The remainder of the tree in Figure 11 was identical 10 the first tree with the 
exception of the "ini! crr" node which contained an additional fault icvel. This was due to 
the possible collision of other objects during sphere initiali7.ation. The resulting five leaf 
nodes were the same as the firs\. tree 
Due to the similarities of the two trees and the fact that the sphere impacting the 
arena seemed morcconscqucntia\, only the sphere-impacts-arcna tree was funher analyzed. 
Each of the five leafTlodes in Figure 10 were then used to start the SFfA process in the next 
step. The use of FTE in this step was essential. Having the ability to graphically represent 
these top-level hazards in a realtime manner made the process of developing these trees 
painlessly effective. 
3. Software Fault Trcc Analysis 
The SFI"A step tx:gan the exciting portion of the analysis. The five source-code-
interfac e leaf nodes in Figure 10 were designated as individual, software-starting root 
nodes for their respective software faul t trees. A mapping of these software-root nodes to 
their associated source code files was generated. This rnapping was accomplished by using 
manual and semi-automated methods to search alJ source code files for relevance to the 
software· root node faults. 111is was extremely useful in reducing the amount of source code 
to be analyzed, however it was time consuming and a bit tedious. Table G shows the results 
of this mapping. 
Fault 
Wrong initialization data provided 
to software 
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Fault Source Code Filc 
illitialization check fails to find Fault_monitof_s.a 
data incorrect Remotc_sphere.a 
Closed loop position algorithm Closc(Uoop_position_ 
generates bad values control.a 
Encoder line tracking not rcgis- Digital_inpuc s.a 




Encoder Line Breaks Encodcr line break causes contin- Digital_outpucs.a 
ucd motion Em;odcrs_b.a 
Table 6: Suft",are Root Node Mappmg to Sphere Source Code FIles 
A second mapping was then generated to identify the specific source cOOe 
procedures and functions that would fall under each software-root node. Once again, the 
identifi(;ation of these pru(;edures and functions was accomplished by searching each pre-
mappb.i. source (;Ode file for modules of relevance. This was an absolutely necessary step 







SW Root Node 
Algorithm Error 
Track Register Error 
TatJle 7: Sphere Source Code Procedures of Interest Mappmg to Software Root Node 
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Source Code File 
FaulCmonitocs.a 


















SW Root Node 
Track Reg Error/ 
Encoder Line Break 
Track Reg Error 
Track Reg Error/ 
Encoder Line Break 
Data Error/Cht".ek Error 
Track Register error 
Encoder Line Breaks 
Track Register Error 
Data Error/Check Error 
Track Register Error 
Ta ble 7: Sphere Source Code Procedures of Interest Mappmg to Software Ruot Node 
in the effort to construct each individual soflware fault tree. Each procedure, functi on and 
task body of interest would become itself a software sub-tree connected to its parent 
software-rool node. Table 7 shows the results of this second mapping. 
a. ACZT 
This step started with some initial work-area house-keeping. An electronic 
directory was generated for each software root node listed in Table 7. The mapped-source-
(;ooe fi les for each node were then (;opied to that directory. Each SOUTce code file was run 
through ACYL capturing the execution using the Unix system script utility. ACIT quickly 
and efficiently generated tree templates for each file. Table 7 shows each source code file 
and the number of ACTT generated nodes in its set of templates. 111ese extremely bushy 








Table 8: Number of ACTT Generated Faull Tree Nodes Per Source Code File 
trees were an expected result. ACIT separated each set of templates into three different 
areas, a main template, exception statement templates and task body templates. Only source 
code with exception and task body constructs generated the latter two template types. This 
execution method for AC'IT allowed clean, concise processing of each required file. The 
outputs from this step, the ACTT generated templates and the Unix script session files. fed 
directly into the next phase of the analysis using the FI tooL 
b. FI Pruning 
The next step in the analysis involved doing a first-pass pruning of 
irrelevant SUb-trees from the generated templates. making them more manageable. Rand 
FfE were used effectively to achieve this. Each generated template was loaded into FI and 
FfE. Fl accurately displayed the number of nodes and tree levels and FrE provided the 
graphical structure. By searching the Unix script files, individual source code lines of 
interest were identified and entered into Fl for processing. The SaUTee code lines of interest 
were chosen based UpOTl the relevance to their associated initial fault statements listed in 
Table 6. FI accurately provided a listing of nodes in the tree relating to each source code 
line. New root nodes were selected and relevant sub-trees generated. Some of the trees were 
able to be pruned directly through I-TE, though FI was still used to identify the correct 
nodes for pruning. This first -pruning process was extremely effective in reducing the sizes 
of aU the fault sub-trees. This was found to hi: an extremely helpful step in that it allowed 
faster. more efficiell\ processing of the suh-trees in the next step, Results AnalYSis. A 
comparison hetween the original and Erst-pruned sub-tree sizes is shown in Tahle 7 
Software Root Node Original First-Pruned # of Nodes # of Nodes 
Check Error CJ47 409 
Data Error 649 411 
Algorithm Error 1756 1325 
Encoder Break 11 50 548 
Tracking Register Error 1527 953 
Table 9: Comparison of Ongmal vs. Pruned Software Root Node Fault 1 ree Size 
Appendix C contains the top-level fault trees fault descriptions and the software-root node 
fault trees generated in the analysis of the Sphere HWCL A complete listing of each nodes 
associated faul t statement is included as welL 
c. Resull.~ Analysis 
At this point, the analysis process had provided a complete fault tree of the 
Sphere JfWCl, starting from the identified specific hazard of interest, sphere impacts 
arena, in the top-level tree, to numerous sourcc-eode-statement-eonstruct leaf nodes 
generated in the sof[ware~rootnode sub trees. The fault tree contained over 5700 nodes and 
depicted all safety-cri.tical possible fault paths. A complete results-analysis step would take 
this data and systematically analyze each possible path to determine which faults could and 
could not occur. This step in itself would be a challenging task to say the least, Due to time 
limitations and the desire to demonstrate the remainder of this methodology, only one 
subset of fault paths was analyzed, The analyzed fault was that relating to the question, if 
an encoder line breaks, what happens'? 
Figure l2: Encoder Line Br-eaks Causal-Link Analysis Diagram 
To analyze this fault an abstract causal-link analysis diagram wa" 
constructed. Figure 12 shows the derived causal steps between the two physical events 
"Encoder line breaks" and "Sphere impacts arena." \¥hen the encoder line breaks, the 
Sphere-HWCI control system determines that an erroneous encoder line speed is present, 
processes that input and sends signals to stop all motion. The analysis looked at the po.~siblc 
logical paths that could QC{;ur to prevent the required stop signals from being sent, thus 
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allowing continued motion of the Sphere into the arena. Figure 13 depicts thl;.': soft\.vart: node 
I ,,',',' I 
-~ 
~'----- leaics.T 
Figure 13: Encoder Line Breaks Soft ware Node Sub· Tree 
sub-tree that represents these logical paths. A calculation eITor in anyone of the attached 
procedures-of-interest sub-trees could caU$e the "ecru brk" node fault, e/1coder line break 
causes continued motion. to be true. thus leading 10 the Sphere impacting the arena. By 
using proof· by-contradiction, a systemati(; process was pcrfonned on each sub-tree 
determining if a calculation error would or would not lead 10 a LIue "ecdr brk" node fault. 
lJTdevant nodes and sub· trees were "diamonded out" through the use of FI and FfE. It was 
found that all procedure-of-interests could be diamonded Ollt except for the "brk ecdr" and 
4] 
"evaluate" sub-trees. Appendix C contains these two procedure-of-interest's final "pruned" 
sub-trees, showing all possible, logical fault paths leading to the "ecdr brk" fau lt node. 
Each of these fault-paths were then analyzed to detennine which, if any, 
could occur. The fault tree depicting the calculation algorithm that determines if the stop 
motion procedure isexecutoo (via setting a boolean value), is shown in Appendix C, Figure 
26. Starting at each leaf node, an examination of the associated source code showed that 
none of the fault-paths could occur. As cach node and its code were analyzed, they were 
diamonded out as it was determined that the robust code structures and fault-tolerant 
procedure calls eliminated a possible fault path. Additionally, the incorporation of 
hardware fairleads on the encoder lines would prevent sphere motion beyond set safety 
distances. Thus, both a software and hardware failure would need to occur before a broken 
encoder line would lead to unintended motion. This concluded the analysis of the encoder 
line break fault showing that the actual source code that calls the stop motion procedure was 
fault-free and correct. 
E. Et'FORT EXPENDED 
This analysis mcthodology required many man-hours of work and a fair amount of 
computer resources. Though many supporting members provided invaluable insight and 
guidance, the day-la-day analysis crunching was basically perforrntxl single-handedly by 
the author. Each methodology step demandoo its own unique effort and resources. The 
actual amount of source code analyzed was in excess of 74,000 lines and required 100 man-
hours to complete. 
The first phase of this methodOlogy, Concept Exploration/System Research, 
Hazard Identification and Preliminary Hazard Analysis, involved a substantial amount of 
reading, examination and interpretation of numerous system resources with minimal 
computcr support effort. Many man-hours were expendtxl tracing system requirements for 
hazard identification and analysis. For example, the PHA on the Sphcre-HWCl and 
Control-CSCI alone required over 35 man-hours to complete. 111is phase was a manual 
process that required the most man -hours and will be the most challenging to automate. 
The second phase of this methodology. Specific Hazard Fault Tree Generation and 
Software Fault Tree Analysis wi th ACTI, 1'1 and PrE, involved minimal amount of 
manual effort and a substantial amount of computer effort. The simultaneous use of ACI'T, 
F1 and J-<i'E was cri tical in this analysis. The: systematic, iterative process of generating fault 
templates with ACTT and alternating between viewingireviewing the associated fault trees 
in PrE and pruningire-generating those trees with FI requi.red a thorough understanding of 
each tool, the methodology and the supporting computer hardware and sofr.varc. With this 
knowledge. the actual effort expended in a typical analysis of one of the given software-
node fault crees was on the order of hOlliS. This time would be further reduced for those 
whose life is devoted 10 software analysis. However, without the use of these semi-
automated too ls and their integration into this methodology, even the most proficient 
software analyst would spend more time in accomplishing the samc analysis. 
The third phase of this methodology. Results Analysis. involved a SO/50 spiit 
bt:tween manual and computer effort. As each individual software-node sub-ITee was 
analyzed, an equal amount of time was spent looking Ihro ugh associated source code files. 
This phase produced the actual listing of possible faulty source code lines and was the 




This tht:sis presented a sample mt:thooo!ogy that demonstrated that Ada-based 
software control systems can be efficiently and effectively analyzed in a practical time 
frame through tile use of existing automated and semi-automated software safety tools and 
methods. The semi-automated tools ACTT. FIE and Fl were used in combination with 
standard software fault tree analysis techniques to provide accurate and meaningful 
software safety analysis data on a real world, currently developing software project. 
Through this methodology implementation, it was found that numerous "manual" holes 
existed in the currenl analysis process. Specifically. the need for an "expert systems" 
approach to executing the system design research step, hazards identification step and the 
preliminary hazard analy~is step was identified. Current lcvel~ of "expert systems" 
technology makes this a steep task to fill. This coupled with the "industry-expecte d" need 
for a human safety analyst, shows a trend towards developmenl of automated toois to assist, 
not replace, the analys!. Nevertheless. any effort towards development of a fully automated 
process will require substanlial resources be directed towards the improvement of these 
analysis tools and expert systems. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
Software analysis of safety-critical control-systems is an ongoing. evolutionary 
process. As more control systems are developed, more methods to analY7.e and process 
them wii1 be deveiopeti. It is essential to disseminate, throughout the software analysis 
community. the lessons k arned from those drvelopmentalprocesses to help promote future 
methodology drvelopment. The methodology presented here is dependent upon the use of 
the semi-automated tools, ACIT, FTE and Fl. These tools and the deve loped methods to 
use them should be madr available for furthrr research and devdopment. 
These tools have demonstrated their usefulness in providing efficient software 
safety analysis capabilities. ACTT provides excellent software analysis data but could be 
improved upon as follows. First. a graphical user interface front-end will eventually 
bewmc essential for wide spread use. Second, additional ACTI generated data output files 
would be useful such as a data session file and a generated node summary file. The FI tool 
gives the analyst a unique capability to manipulate and isolate fault trees. R could be 
improved upon by adding additional functionality such as a Delete Sub-Tree and a Move 
Child/Sibling uption. PTE could be improved by adding a zoom in/zoom out option, a 
thumbnail tree viewing option, an increased viewing window size and some sort of "pretty-
tree" printing capability. A logical extension of these tools (;Quid be the combining of all 
three into one "Software Safety AnaJysis Tool Suite." This would provide the best utility 
of all and give the analyst one complete tool package. 
Continuing research and development of semi-automated and automated software 
analysis tools is essential in achieving a useful, standardized software analysis 
methodology. Though achieving a completely automated process in the near tenn seems 
unlikely to this author, continued work. in each area of safety analysis will produce the 
stepping stones towards that desirable goaL 
APPENDIX A. SOFTWARE FAULT TREE SYMBOLOGY 
CJ <> REef ANGLE DTAMO).,'D 
(Decomposabk Event) (Non-decomposed Event) 
TJUANGLE ELLIPSE 
(Link to Other Tree) (System State Permitting a Fault) 
o 
CIRCLE HOUSE 
(Elementary Event) (Nonnally Occurring System Event) 
AND GATE 
Figure 14: Software Fault Tr..-e Symbols 
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APPENDIX B. MESA CONTROL CSC! PHA RESULTS 
MESA Software Development Plan 
SDP SDP Requirement Possible Ha;>:ard Possible Result Severity Para Ref 
1.2.2 Con(Toi esc, Erroneous control Hardware/personnel High 
moves and posi· signals are gelll:r- damage/injury 
tions the simula- ated and sent to the 
tion hard wan:: system hardware 
1.2.2 Control esc' pro- Operator direct~ Hardware/pcrsonnel High 
vides operator unsafe or in(;orrect damage/i njury 
interface to control inputs to Control 
progress of simula- eSCI 
tion 
1.2.2 Control eSCI logs Control develops Log analysis generates High 
operations for erroneous log future hazardous pro-
fu ture reference entries cedlUc.~/actions 
3.3 Operator has corn- Operator erronc- Hardware/personnel High 
plete overrjde capa- ouslyoverrides damage/injury 
bil ity over Control Control CSCT 
CSCI 
3.3 Operator mU.~t Operator misjudgl;.":s Hardware/pl;.":rsonnel High 
detennine the track obstructions in free damage/injury 
in the measure-
ment zone is free of 
obstructions 
3.3 GUl provides audi- GUl warning sig- Hardware/Pelsonnd High 
ble and visual nals fail damage/injury 
warnings to opera-
tor on impending 
danger 
3.3 All critical data Checksums errone- Erroncous control sig- Low to 
transrruSSlOns use ousiy calculated nals generated - system High 
checksums failure. Hardware/per-
sonnd damage/injury 
Table 10. PHA 011 Software Development Plan 
" 
MESA Software Requirements Specification 
SRS SRS Requirement Possible Hazard Possible Result Severity Para Ref 
3.1 .1 Control CSCI shall Engagement gener- Erroneous data collcc- M'" 
provide for the arion computer tion, undesired engage- to 
input of data files maintains incorrect ment parameters High 
from Engagement data fi les resulting in hardware 
Generation damage 
3.1.2 Control CSC! shall DAC maintains Damage to sensor, High 
pass series and run incorrect parameters erroneous data coUec-
parameters to OAC tion 
3.2 Control CSCl shall Hardware devices Damage to hardware, High 
send Stan Motion, continue to operate/ loss of data 
Stop Motion, Emer- remain still against 
gency Stop Marion operator's request 
commands within 
given time limits 
3.2.2.a.2 Control shall Inconsistent and/or Erroneous data collec- High 
-4 update infonna- erroneous data tion. hardware devices 
tion, the State Table maintained in Sys- incorrectly maneu-
and the system sta- vered resulting in dam-
tus/positions at the age. 
System Update 
Rate 
3.2.2.3.a Control CSCI shall HWCI computers Damage to hardware, High 
download execu(- fai l to execute loss of data 
able software to required program 
the ST, OTS, and 
Sphere Computers 
when they power 
up 
3.2.2.3.b Control CSCI shall Erroneous run Unanticipated hard- High 
increment the run parameters loaded ware motion and dam-
number after each age, erroneous data 
engagement collected 
lable ll: PHA on Software ReqUirements SpcclficatlOn 
SRS SRS Requirement Possible Hazard Possible Result Severity Para Ref 
3.2.2.3.c Given a GO signal Failure to start Damage to hardware High 
fro m operator, Con- motion of devices could re.~u lt from colli · 
Irol shall start could lead to a colli- sion, erroneous data 
motion of all collected 
related devices not 
already in motion 
and reset the retry 
counter and the 
motion-fault timer 
for those devices 
3.2.2.3.d Given a STOP 8ig- Failurc to Stop Damage to hardware High 
nal from operator, motion of devices could result from colli-
Control shall stop could lead to a colli- sion, erroneous data 
motion of all sion situation collected 
related devices 
3.2.2.3.1 Control shall reject IRS interface IRS interface incom- High 
.I.h sensor beam run incumpatibility patibility 
mode and Colii-
sion Risk combina-
tions that arc 
checked in the 
given table 
3.2.2.3.1 Control shall not OTS control line OTS control line fail- High 
.3.a pennit a move that tension limit ure, erratic OTS 
exceeds the conuol exceeded motion, hardware col 
line tension limits lision and damage 
for the specified 
Target and Sphere 
conlfOlline in auto-
matic mode. 
3.2.2.3.1 Conuol shall calcu- Erroneous danger Target and ST col1i- High 
.3.d late Target danger zone calculated sian/damage 
3.2.2.3. 1 Control shall caJcu- Erroneous danger rarget and ST colli- High 
.3 . I .a.1 late the ST danger zone calculated sion/damage 
lable 11: PHA on Software Reqlllremenls Specification 
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SRS SRS Requirement Possible Hazard Possible Result Severity Para Ref 
3.2.2.3.1 Control shall pre- Target and ST dan- Target and 5T colli- High 
.3. I.a.2 vent Targel danger gerzonesover]ap sian/damage 
zone from inter-
secting with ST 
danger zone in 
Automatic mode 
3.2.2.3.1 Control shaU calcu- Erroneous Collision or near miss High 
A.I.e late the "Check Collision_Risk cal- of 5T and Target, hard-
Collision" point culate<! ware damage 
3.2.2.3.1 When operator Erroneous data cal- Collision of 5T and High 
4.4.h.1 c licks forward run cu]ated/passed 10 Target, hardware dam-
(non-collision), HWCI's ,go 
Control shal l exe-
cute operations for Parameters out of Collision of 5T and/or 
a forward run: limits condition Target w ith MESA 
I)Move STto stan position 5T in target facility structure 
point2)Calculalc danger zone 
ST motion profiles 
3)Send run parame-
ters to DAC 4)Pro-
gram SPG 5)Start 
ST motion 6)Send 
idle to DAC when 
ST stops 
Table U: PHA on Software ReqUirements SpecificatIOn 
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SRS SRS Requirement Possible Hazard Possible Result Severity Para Ref 
3.2 .2.3.1 \Vhen operator Erroneous da ta ca1- Collision of ST and High 
.4.4.h.2 cl icks reverse run culatcd!passcd ill Target, hardware dam-
(non-collision), [-lWei's age 
Control shall exe- Collision of ST and/or 
cute operations for Pararne tl;.': fS out {)[ Target with MESA 
a reyerse run limits condition facility structure 
1 )Movc ST to start position ST in targt:! 
point 2)Calculate danger zone 
ST motion profiles 
3 )Send run parame-
ters [ 0 DAC 4)Pro-
gram SPG 5)Start 
ST morion 6)Send 
idle to OAC when 
ST stops 
3.2.2.3.1 \Vhen operator Erroneous data cal- Collision of ST and High 
A.4.h.3 clicks reverse run culaled/passed to Target, hardware dam-
(collision), Control HWCl's 'g' 
shall execute opera- Collision of ST and/or 
tions for a reverse Parameters out of Target with MESA 
run (collision)" limits condi tion fac ility structure 
I )Determine position 5T in target 
AtoD_Start 2)Cal- danger zone 
culate ST motion 
profiles 3)Send run 
parameters to DAC 
4)Program SPG 
5)Wait lOOms 
6)Start ST motion 
7)Send idle to OAC 
when ST stops 
Table n. PH A on Software ReqUirements SpecificatIOn 
55 
SRS SRS Requirement Possible Hazard Possible Result Severity Para Ref 
3.2.2.3.1 Control shall per- Erroneous Run- Erroneous run- time High 
.4.4.c.3 form the following rime Log entry reports, unneeded pro-
operations at the ct:dural changes made 
end of a data run: Erroneous next step 
I)Provide operator sct: Next cngagc- Collision of ST and 
a list to choose ment vice Next o-a- Target, hardware dam-




run sets SCI 
Engagement 3)For 
no OOT, set Run 
time Log, trajectory 
and engagement 
info. 
3.2.2.3.1 Control shall Erroneous Engagc- Induces operator error High 
.4.5 retrieve Next ment retrieved causing coll ision of ST 
Engagement and/or Target with 
MESA facili ty struc-
3.2.23.1 When Next Trajec- Erroneous next tra- Collision of ST and High 
.4.7 tory sele<:ted. Con- jeCtory conditions Target with MESA 
trol shall get next retrieved facility structure, hard-




3.2.2.1 .1 Control shall gener- Failure to generate Collision of ST and High 
.4.8.a.1 ate warning mes- warning message, Target with MESA 
sage for invalid erroneous traJec- facility structure, hard-
next trajector y. tory conditions used ware damage on next 
Table 11: PHA on Soft-ware ReqUirements SpecillcatlOn 
56 
SRS SRS Requirement Possible Ha"lard Possible Result Severity Para Ref 
3.2.2.3 . 1 Control shall pass Erroneous read of Collision of ST and High 
.4.8 .a.2 trajectory number engagement param- Target with MESA 
and engagement clers from r:ngage- facility structure. hard-
parameters to GUI memfile ware damage on next 
3.2.2.3 .2 When EMER Stop motion com- Collision of ST and High 
. l.a STOP pressed . mands erroneously Target with MESA 
Control shall or not at all gencr- facility structure, hard-
l)Stop all motion 
"'" 
ware damagt: on next 
2)Gcm:rate fault 
log 3)Rcquest and 
enter operator com- Personnel injury 
mem 
3.2.2.3.2 When ABORT Stop motion COln- Collision of ST and High 
.1.b pressed, Comrol mands to ST crrollc- Target with MESA 
shall I )Stop ST ously or not at ali facility structure, hard-
2)Request and enter generated ware damage on next 
operator comment 
3.2.2.3 .2 When Hardware Stop motion com- Colli~ion of ST and High 
. I.e EMER S"IDP rnands to S1' errone- Target with MESA 
pressed. Control ously or not at aU facility structure, hard-
shall l )S top all generated ware damage on next 
devices 2)Generate 
fault log 3)Rc:quest 
and enter operator Personnel injury 
3.2.2.3.2 Control shall stop Stop motion eom- Collision of ST and High 
.2.b device motion rnands to ST errone- Target with MESA 
when software limit ous]y or not at all facility structure, hard-
exceeded. generated ware damage on next 
Personnel injury 
Table 11: PHA on Software ReqUIrements SpecIficatIOn 
SRS SRS Requirement Possible Hazard ParaRer 
3.2.23 ,2 Control shall not Erroneous speed 
.2.c conunand 5T w commands gener-
speeds in excess of aled 
5T speed zones. 
3.2.2.3.2 When main hoist Stop motion c:om-
.2.d software limit mands to deviCl;::s 
detected, Control erroneously or not 
shall 1 )Stop all at all generated 
devices in motion 
2)Generate fault 




Collision of 5T and 
Target with MESA 
facility structure, hard-
ware damage on next 
Collision of ST and 
Target with MESA 
facility structure. hard-
ware damage on next 




APPENDIX C. GENERATED FAULT TREES AND FAULT 
1l~;SCRIPTION LISTINGS 
1. Top-Level Specific Hallolrd Faults 
A. Sphere lmpac:ts Arena 
B. Sphere Impacts Object Other Than Arena 
2. Software Starting Root Node Faults 
A. Data error 
B. Check Error 
C. Algorithm Error 
D. Encoder L iTle Breaks 
£. Tracking Error in Sofw.'aIC 
3. Encoder Line Breaks Analysis Faults 
A. Evaluate Node Sub-Tree Faults 
Level One (Root to 264) 
• Level Two (264 to 86) 
• Level Three (86 to Leaves) 







Figure 15/1'ablc 14 
Figure 16{fable 15 
Figun: 17(J"abk 16 
Figur~ lSrrable 17 
Figure 19(J"ablc 18 
Figure 20rrable J 9 
Figure 21{fahlc 20 
Figure 22rrable 21 
Figure 23ffable 22 
Figure 24/rahle 23 
Figure 25{fahle 24 
Figure 26{fabk 25 
Node Label Fault Description 
impact Sphere impacts arena 
cdn brk Control line breaks 
control Control causes sphere impact 
wall near Sphere is close to arena structure 
motion Controlled motion causes sphere impact 
sw fail Software command.~ motion causing sphere impact 
init err Initial position set in software causes erroneous motion 
check er Initialization check fails to find data incorrect 
data err Wrong initialization data provided to software 
value er Undesired movement value generated 
algr err Closed loop position algorithm generates bad values 
track er Invalid incremental movement calculation 
tr reg er Encoder line tracking not registered in software 
ecdr brk Encoder line break causes continued motion 
hI,',' fail Hardware Failure produces motion causing sphere impact 
Table 12: Sphere Impacts Arena Fault Description Listing 
60 
Node Label Fault Description 
impact Sphere impacts arena 
cnul brk Conuolline breaks 
conuol Conttol causes sphere impaet 
near obj Sphere is dose to arena sttucture 
motion Conttolled motion causes sphere impact 
sw fail Software conunands motion causing sphere impact 
init err Initial position set in software causes erroneous motion 
man hook Manual positioning causes erroneous motion 
Initial position set in software causes erroneous motion 
data err Wrong initialization data provided to software 
eheck er Initialization data fails to find data incorrect 
value er Undesired movement value generated 
algrerr Closed loop position algorithm generates bad values 
uacker Invalid incremental movement calculation 
II reg er Encoder line tracking nor registered in software 
cedr brk Encoder line break causes continued motion 
hw fail Hardware Failure produces motion causing sphere impact 
obj mot Object motion other than sphere causes impact 
target Target motion cause.~ impact 
Sensor transport motion (;auses impact 
Actual sensor motion causes impact 
other Other object motion causes impact 
Tahle 13: Sphere Impacts Object Other Than Arena Faull Descripl.ion Listing 
61 
Figure 15: Data Error Fault Tree 
Figure 16: Check Error Fault Tree 
62 
Node Label Fault Description 
data err Wrong initialization data providnl to software 
oper err Operator manually inputs erroneous initialization daTa 
Software generates erroneous initialization data 
Initialize_Encoders_History procedure in Remote_sphere.a 
causes fault 
initl Initialize_l procedure in Remote_sphere.a causes fault 
init2 Initialize_2 procedure in Remote_sphere.a causes fault 
go 
Initial_Engagement_Conditions procedure in 
Remotc_sphere.a causes fault 
Go procedure in Remote_sphere.a causes fault 
Table 14: Dat.a Error Fault Description Listing 
Node Label Fault Description 
check er Initialization check fails to find data incorrect 
inieecdr Initialize_Encoders_flistory procedure in 
Faulemonitocs.a causes fault 
init2 Initialize_2 procedure in Renlote_sphere.a causes fault 
initl Initializel procedure in Remote_sphere.a causes fault 
illleeng InitiaLEngagcmeneConditions procedure in 
Remotc_sphere.a causes fault 
go Go procedure in Rernote_sphere.a causes fault 
Table 15: Check Error Fault Description Listing 
63 
Figure 17: Algorithm Error Fault Tree 
64 
Node Label Faull Description 
algr err Closed loop position algorithm generates bad values 
calc tol Calc_ Within_Tolerance procedure causes fault 
calc err Calc_Errors procedure causes fault 
cal(; step Calc Steps procedure causes fault 
step null Steps_Dr_Null procedure eauses faul t 
move step Move_Steppers procedure causes fa ult 
spread err Spread_OCErrors_During_Settic And_Hold_Times 
procedure causes fault 
Table 16: Algorithm Error Fault DesCription Li !>1ing 
65 
f 'igure 18: Encoder Line Break Errnr Fault Tree 
66 
Node Label Fault Description 
ecdr brk: Encoder line break causes continued motion 
hw break Hardware causes encoder line to break 
calc err Softwarc generates erroneous data causing encoder line 
to break 
ecdr off EncodcrLOff procedure in DigitaLoutput_s.a causes 
fault 
unfreeze Unfreeze_Encoder_Readings proeedme in 
DigitaLoutpucs.a causes fault 
freeze Freeze_Encoder_Readings procedure in 
Digital_outpul_s.a causes fault 
brk ecdr Broken_EncodecLine procedure in 
FaulCMonitocs.a causes fault 
evaluate Evaluate procedure in Evaluate_s.a causcs fault 
ecdr on Encoders_On procedure in Digital_outpucs.a causes 
fault 
ecdr down Encoders_Down procedure in DigitaLoutpucs.a 
C!luses fault 
ecdr up Encoders_Up procedure in Digilal_outpucs.a causcs 
fault 
Table 17: Encoder Liue Break Error Fault Description Listing 
.'igure 19: Encoder Line Tracking Error Fault Tree 
68 
Node Label Fault Desl-nption 
tr reg er Encoder line traeklng not registered in sofN/are 
get enrr Get_Control_Words procedure in Digital_input_s.a causes fault 
ecdr up Encoders_Up procedure in Digital_outpucs.a causes fault 
ecdr down Encoders_Down procedure in DigitaLoutpucs.a causes faul t 
eedr on Encoders_On procedure in DigitaLoutpuc s.a causes fault 
ecdr off Encoders_Off procedure in Digital_outpucs.a causes fault 
unfreeze Unfrceze_EncodecReadings procedure in Digital_output_s.a 
causes fault 
freeze Freezc_Encoder_Readings proct'-dure in Digital_outpucs.a 
causes fault 
get vals Gee Values procedure in Encoders_b.a causes fault 
evaJuate Evaluate procedure in Evaluate_s.a causes fault 
check mal Check_For_Malfunction procedure in Fault_monitor_s.a causes 
fault 
hw reset HW _Reset procedure in Hw_reset.a causes fault 
move cedr Move_Encoder_Line procedure in Remote sphere.a causes fault 
set stat Set_State procedure in Remole_sphere.a causes fault 
stop mot Stop_Motion procedure in Remote_sphere.a causes fault 
stop line Stop_All_Lines procedure in Remote_sphere.a causes fault 
Table 18: Encoder Line Tracking Error Fault Description Listing 
R'C Level One Figure 20: Evaluate Sub-T 
70 
Node Label Fault Description 
evaluate Sequence of statements causes Fault 
539 Last statement c:.:auses Fault 
53 5 If Statement causes Fault 
538 Previous statements causes Fault 
536 Last Statement did not mask Fault 
537 Sequence prior to last eauscs Fauit 
507 Sequence of statements causes Fault 
506 Last statement causes Fault 
502 If statement causes Fault 
505 Previous statements causes Fault 
503 Last Statement did not Illilsk Filult 
504 Sequence prior to las\ causes Fault 
475 Sequence of statements causes Fault 
474 Last statement causes Fault 
469 Procedure call causes Fault 
473 Previous statements causes Fault 
471 Last Statement did not mask Fault 
472 Sequence prior to last causes Fault 
455 Sequence of statements causes Fault 
454 Last statement causes Fault 
450 If statement c:.:iluses Filult 
453 Previous statements causes Faul t 
451 Last Statement did not mask Fault 
Table 19: Evaluate Sub-Tree Level One Faull Description Listing 
Node Label Fault Description 
452 Sequence prior to last causes Fault 
422 S~uence of statement~ causes Fault 
421 Last statement causes Fault 
414 Assignment Statement causes Fault 
420 Previous statements causes Fault 
418 Last Statement did not mask Fault 
419 Sequence prior to last causes Fault 
409 Sequence of statements causes Fault 
408 Last statement causes Fault 
403 Procedure caU causes Fault 
407 Previous statements causes Fault 
405 Last Statement did not mask Faull 
406 Sequence prior to last causes Fault 
390 Sequence of statements causes Fault 
389 Last statement causes Fault 
385 Procedure call causes Fault 
388 Previous statements causes Fault 
386 Last Statement did not mask Fault 
387 Sequence prior to last causes Fault 
377 Sequence of stat!;':ments causes Fault 
376 Last statement causes Fault 
367 Assignment Statement causes Fault 
375 Previous statements causes Fault 
373 Last Statement did not mask Fault 
374 Sequenc!;': prior to last causes Fault 
Tallie 19: Evaluate Sub-Tree Level One Fault Description Listing 
Node Label Fault Description 
359 Sequence of statements causes Fault 
358 Last statement causes Fault 
349 Assignment Statement causes Fault 
357 Previous statements causes Fault 
355 Last Statement did not mask Fault 
356 Sequence prior to last causes Fault 
339 Sequence of statements causes Fault 
338 Last statement causes Fau lt 
329 Assignment Statement causes Fault 
337 Previous statements causes Fault 
335 Last Statement did not mask Fault 
336 Sequcnce prior to last causes Fault 
319 Sequence of statements causes Fault 
318 Last statement causes Fault 
309 Assignment Statement causes Fault 
317 Previous statements causes Fault 
31 5 Last Statement did not mask Fault 
316 Sequence prior to last causes Fault 
30 I Sequence of statements causes Fault 
300 Last statement causes Fault 
295 Procedure eall causes Fault 
299 Previous statements causes Fault 
297 Last Statement did not mask Fault 
298 Scquem.:e prior to last causes Fault 
no Sequence of statements causes Fault 
Table 19: Evaluate Sub-Tree Lel'cl Onc Fault Dcscril)tion Listing 
73 
Node Label Fault Description 
279 Last statement causes Fault 
270 Assignment Statement causes Fault 
278 Previous statements causes Fault 
276 Last Statement did not mask Fault 
277 Sequence prior to last causes Fault 
264 Sequence of statements causes Fault 
Table 19: Evaluate Sub-Trre Level One Fault Description Listing 
- ree Level Two Figure 21: E,'aluate Sub T 
" 
Node Label Fault Description 
264 Sequence of statements causes Fault 
263 Last statement causes Fault 
259 Procedure call causes Fault 
262 Previous statements causes Fault 
260 Last Statt:ment did not mask Fault 
261 Sequence prior to last causes Fault 
250 Sequence of statements causes Fault 
249 Last statement causes Fault 
244 Procedure call causes Fault 
248 Previous statements causes Fault 
246 Last Statement did not mask Fault 
247 Sequence prior to last causes Fault 
231 St:quence of statements causes Fault 
230 Last statt:ment causes Fault 
225 Procedure call causes Faull 
229 Previous statements causes Fault 
227 Last Statement did not mask Fault 
228 Sequence prior to last causes Fault 
209 Sequence of statements causes Fault 
208 Last statement causes Fault 
203 Procedure call causes Fault 
207 Previous statements causes FauJt 
205 Last Statement did not mask Fault 
Table 20: Evaluate Sub-Tree l.evel Two Faull Dl'Scription Listing 
76 
Node Label Fault Description 
206 Sequence prior to last causes Fault 
IS7 Sequence of statements causes Fault 
186 Last statement causes Fault 
18 2 Procedure call causes Fault 
185 Previous st:1tements causes Fault 
183 Last Statement did not mask Fault 
I H4 Sequence prior to last (;auses Fault 
174 Sequence of statements causes Fault 
173 Last statement causes Fault 
169 Tf statement causes Fault 
165 Evaluation of condition causes Fault 
168 Condition true and statements causes Fault 
166 If condition !rue 
167 l'hen statements causes Fault 
159 Sequence of statements causes Fault 
158 Last statement causes Fault 
154 If statement causes Fault 
157 Previous statements causes Fault 
155 Last Statement did not mask Fault 
156 Sequence prior to last causes Fault 
164 Sequence of statements causes Fault 
163 Last statement causes Fault 
86 If statement causes Fault 
162 Previous statements causes Fault 
172 Previous statements causes Fault 
Table 20; Eva/llall! Suu-Trel! Level Two F'auit Description Listing 
Figure 22: Evaluate Sub-Tree L.evel Three 
78 
Node Label Fault Description 
86 If statement causes Fault 
82 Evaluation of condition causes Fault 
8S Condition nue and statements causes Fault 
83 If condition true 
84 Then statements causes fault 
S4 Sequence of statements causes Fault 
53 Last statement causes Fault 
44 Assignment Statement causes Fault 
S2 Previous statements (;auses Fault 
50 Last Statement did nol mask fault 
51 Sequence prior to last causes Fault 
59 Sequence of statemrnts (;auses Fault 
58 Last statement (;ausrs Fault 
40 Procedure call causes Fault 
37 Procedure elaboration causes Faull 
38 Procedure body (;auses Fault 
39 P rocedure not found on table 
57 Previous statemenTS (;3USCS Fault 
79 ELSE pan causes Fault 
80 Action by othrr task on variable causes Fault 
Table 21.: Evaluate Sub-Tree Level Three Fault Description Listing 
Figure 23: Rrk Ecdr Root Sub-Tree 
80 
Node Label Fault Description 
brk ecdr Sequence of statements causes Fault 
235 Last statement causes Fault 
223 Loop Statement causes Fault 
224 Loop never executed 
231 Loop condition evaluation causes Fault 
229 Nth Iteration causes Fault 
22 1 Sequence of statements causes Fault 
220 Last statement causes Fault 
216 If statement causes Fault 
212 Evaluation of condition causes Fault 
215 Conditi on true and statements causes Fault 
213 If condition true 
214 Then statements causes Fault 
204 Sequence of statements causes Fault 
203 Last statement causes Fault 
194 Assignment statement causes fa ul t 
202 Previous statements causes Fault 
200 Last Statement did not mask Fault 
201 Sequence prior to last causes fault 
184 Sequence of statements causes Fault 
183 Last statement causes Fault 
179 If statement causes fau lt 
182 Previous statements causes Fault 
Table 22: Urk Eerlr Root Sub·Tree Fault Description Listing 
Node Label Fault Description 
180 Last Statement did not mask Fault 
181 Sequence prior to last causes Fault 
209 Sequence of statements causes Fault 
208 Last statement causes Fault 
46 Assignment Statement causes Fault 
207 Previous statement'> causes Fault 
210 Action by other task on variable causes Fault 
219 Previous statements causes Fault 
228 Condition true past n-J 
234 Previous statements causes Fault 
Table 22: Brk Ecdr Root Sub·Tree Fault Description Listing 
82 
Figure 24: Hrk Ecdr Node 194 Sub-Tree 
Node Label Fault Description 
194 Assignment Statement causes Fault 
197 Change in values causes Fault 
198 Exception causes Fault 
199 Operand Evaluation causes Fault 
188 Indexed Component causes Fault 
185 Encoders 3000ms_Ago 
un Relation causes Fault 
193 Relation causes Fault 
192 lnde;.;oo Component causes Fault 
189 Encoders_Current 
191 Relation causes Fault 
195 Action by other task on variable causes Fault 
Tahle 23: Rrk Ecdr Node 194 Sub-Tree Fault Description Listing 
84 
Figure 25: Br" Ecdr Node 179 Sub T • - ree 
85 
Node Label Fault Description 
179 If statement causes Fault 
175 Evaluation of condition causes Fault 
178 Condition true and statements causes Fault 
176 If condition true 
177 111en statements causes Fault 
169 Sequence of statements causes Fault 
168 Last statement causes Fault 
167 Previous statements causes Fault 
165 LaSt Statement did not mask Fault 
166 Sequence prior to last causes Fault 
16 I Sequence of statements causes Fault 
160 Last statement causes Fault 
155 Procedure call causes Fault 
159 Previous statements causes Fault 
157 Last Statement did not mask Fault 
158 Sequence prior to last causes Fault 
144 Sequence of statements causes Fault 
143 Last statement causes Fault 
139 If statement causes Fault 
142 Previous statements causes FaUlt 
140 Last Statement did not mask FauLt 
141 Sequence prior to last causes Fault 
84 Sequence of statements causes Fault 
Table 24: Brk Ecdr Node 179 Sub-Tree Fault I)escriplion Listing 
86 
Node Label Fault Dcsc:.:ription 
83 Last statement causes Fault 
79 Procedure call causes Fault 
76 Procedure elaboration causes Fault 
77 Procedure body causes Fault 
78 Procedure not found on table 
82 Previous statements causes Fault 
80 Last Statement rlid not mask Fault 
81 Sequen(;e prior to last causes Fault 
174 Sequence of statements causes Fault 
173 Last statement causes Fault 
73 Procedure call causes Fault 
69 Procedure elaboration causes Fault 
70 Procedure body causes Faull 
71 Off 
72 Procedure not found 011 table 
74 Parameter evaluation causes Fault 
65 Relation causes Fault 
67 Action by other task causes Fault 
172 Previous statemt:nts causes Fault 
Table 24: Brk Ecdr Node 179 Sub-Tree Fault Description Listing 
l<'igurc 26: Brk Ecdr Node 46 Sub-Tree 
88 
Node Label fault Description 
46 Assignmcnt Statement causes fault 
49 Change in values causes Fault 
50 EJ\ception causes Faull 
51 Operand Evaluation causes Fault 
23 lndeJ\ed Component causes Fault 
22 Relation causes Fault 
45 Relation causes Fault 
44 Indexed Component causes Fault 
25 Counts_Unsigned 
43 Relation causes Fault 
42 Division or Multiplication causes Fault 
39 Indexed Component causes Fault 
27 Rcal 
311 Relation causes Fault 
37 Addition or Subtraction cau~s Fault 
31 Indexed Component causes Fault 
30 Relation cau~es Fault 
29 LineN umber 
32 Subtraction causes Fault 
36 Indexed Component causes Fault 
Table 25: Brk Ecdr Node 46 Sub-Tree Fault Description Listing 
89 
Node Label Fault Description 
33 Encodcrs_Currcnt 
35 Relation causes Fault 
4D Division By Zero causes Fault 
47 Action by other ta~k on variable causes Fault 
Table 25: Brk Eedr Node 46 Sub-Tree Fault Description Listing 
90 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
L(',veson, Nancy G., "SofTWare Safety: Why, What and How. ACM Compmlng 
Su,-.,'eys. Volume. 18, No.2, pp. 125-163, June 1986. 
Reid Jr .. William S., Software Fault Tree Analysis of Concurrent Ada Prm;csscs, 
M.S. Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, September 1994 
3. Kopetz, fl .. "Software Reliability", Springer-Verlag New York Inc., 1979 
4. I-lcimerdinger, W. and Weinstock. c., "A Com.:eptual Framework for System Fault 
Tolerance", Technical Report CMUISEI-92-TR-33 Carnegie Mel/on University. 
Ol:tober 1992. 
5. Nelson, v., " Fault-Tolerant Computing: Fundamental Concepl~".IEEE CompUler, 
Voluml;': . 23, No.7. pp. 19-25, July 1990. 
Anderson, T. and Lee, P., "Fault Tolerant Principles and Practices", Princeton Hall 
Booh,19111. 
7. Casey, Steven, "Set Phasers on Stun and Other Tales of Design, Technology and 
Human Error", Aegean Publishing Company, 1993. 
8. Place. Patrick R.H" and Kang, Kyo C., "Safety-Critical Software: Status Report and 
Annotated Bibliography''' Technical Report CMUISFJ-f}2-TR·5 Carnegie Mellon 
University, June 1991. 
9. Ordonio, Robert R., An Automated Tool to Facilitate Code Translation for Software 
Fault Tree Analysis, M.S. Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 
September 1993. 
10. Mason, Russell w., Fault Isolator Tool for Software Fault Tree Anaiysis. M.S. 
Thesis, Naval Postgraduate SchooL Monterey, CA, March 1995. 
lL Lcveson, Nancy G. and Stolzy. J.L., "Safety Analysis Using Petri Ncts , IEEE 
Transac/juns on Software Engineering , Volume SE-13, No.1, pp.386-397, March 
1987. 
12. Barel. David. "Statecharts: A Visual FOnTmlism for Complex Systems", Science of 
Computer Programming Paper, July 1986. 
13. Noble, W. B" "f)l;':veloping Safe Software for Critkal Airborne Applications". 
Proceedings oithe 1££E 6th Digital Avionics Systeml' Conference, December 1984, 
Baltimore, MD 
9( 
14. MESA Development Team, Software Development Plan (SDP) for Missile 
Engagement Simulation Arena (MESA) Control Software, Naval Air Warfare 
Center Weapons Division, China Lake, CA, August 1993. 
15 MESA Development Team, Software Requirements Specification (SRS) for Missile 
Engagement Simulation Arena (MESA) Control Software, Naval Air Warfare 
Center Weapons Division, China Lake, CA. August 1993. 
16. Mclnt~, J. W. Jr., "Pault Tree Techniques as Applied to Software (Soft Tree)", 
Technical Report, Uniled States Air Force , March 1983. 
17. Leveson. Nancy G. and Harvey, P. R , "Analyzing Software Safety", IEEE 
Transactions on Software Engineering, Volume SE-9, No.5. pp.569-579, September 
1983 
18, Taylor, 1. R" "Fault Tree and Cause Consequence Analysis for Control Software 
Validation", RlSO National Laboratory, DK-4000 Doskilde, Denmark, pp. 5-17. 
January 1982. 
19. Cha, Stephen S .. "A Safety Critical Software Design and Verification Technique". 
Ph.D. Dissertation. Technical Report 91 -62, University of California , Irvine , 1991. 
INITIAL DlSTRlBlJTlON LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center. 
Cameron Station 
Alexandria, V A 22304-6145 
2. Library, Code 013 . 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5101 
3. Chairman, Code CS 
Computer Science Deparuncnl 
Naval Postgraduate School 
\-lonterey, CA 93943 
4. Prufessor Timothy J. Shimeall, Code CS/Sm . 
Computer Science Department 
Naval Post~,'radllate School 
Monterey, CA 93943 
5. Lt. Col. David A. Gaitros . 
AFCES/CEOA 
139 Bames Drive, Suite I 
Tyndall AFR, FL 32403-5319 
6. Dr. Robert M. Winter .. 
Physics Department 
Shippensburg University 
Shippensburg, PA 17257 
7. !'vlrs. Therese F. Giles .. 
Software Project Manager 
1490 West Lakeland Drive 
Mechanicsville, MD 20659 
8. Mr. Robert Parchetta . 
71 Blue Spruce Lane 
Ballston Lake, NY 120 19 
9. Mr. Robert Westbrook. 
Naval Air Warfare Center· Weapons 
Code 45FOOOD 
China Lake, CA 93555·6001 
91 
... . . 2 
. ... . . 2 
. • .. 1 
. .... ... 4 
. .... . 4 
. . ..• 1 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
" . . . . 1 
• • • J 
10. Mr. Kenneth Wetzel. .. 
Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons 
Code 4713 100 
China Lake, CA 93555-6001 
11. Mr. Tom Roseman. 
Naval Air Warfare Center - Weapons 
Code 4713100 
China Lake, CA 93555-6001 
12. CDR Michael J. Holden. 
Computer Science Department (Code CSlHm) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943 
13. CDR Mark Barber 
Computer Science Department (Code CS/Bm) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943 
14. Mrs. Mary C. Winter. 
6700 NE 182nd Street 
Seattle, WA 98155 
15. Dr. Mario Ghezw . . 
General Electric Research and Development 
1 River Road 
Building 40-4 
Schenectady. NY 12345 
16. LCDR Mathias W. Winter .. 
121 East Burd Street 
Shippensburg, PA 17257 
.1 
. . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
. • . • . • . • . • . . 1 
.. 1 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . • 1 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
. ... 2 
lJuo",v KNOX UBRARV 
N.WAb f)Q'TORAOUATE SCHOOl 
j,l;CNt~R&'Y CA Il13043-5101 

